


May-June 1940 Was France's defeat inevitable?












Pétain & de Gaulle: opposite conclusions


The French defeat of 1940: bad luck or necessity?

1939: a reluctant France declared war on Germany





France: 1.4 million dead (highest per capita)





Georges Clemenceau in 1919


Fear of a German revenge Fundamental preoccupation: security To weaken Germany as much as possible The Rhineland detached from Germany (independent state occupied militarily by France)

The Rhineland: a buffer to protect France from another German invasion

Lloyd George

But Germany not to be ruined: a potential **economic partner** in the future


Balance of power in Europe – Little support to France until 1939 1930s appeasement



No alliance with Russia like in 1914


Poland: unreliable until 1939 (non-aggression declaration with Germany in 1934)

Belgium's **neutrality** (1936): no common military strategy



Italy allied to Germany since 1936

1939: France could only rely on British support



France's attitude towards Germany after 1933

Germany: repeated violations of the Treaty of Versailles 1935: mandatory conscription reinstated 1936: the Rhineland re-militarized

France: 1936-1938: support to British appeasement

ALC: N LTO


France: the **Popular Front** (left wing coalition in power (1936-1938) **rehabilitated**

France's defeat in 1940 was not inevitable

Impressive French rearmament prior to 1939







The methods of historians to analyze historical facts

Daily Mirror Daily Mirror IT IS PEACE AT MUNICH THE MORNING HERE

T IS PEACE. AT MUNICH THIS MORNING HERR HITLER ACCEPTED A SETTLEMENT OF THE CZECH CRISIS SUBSTANTIALLY ON THE BASIS OF THE ORIGINAL VLAN SUBMITTED TO HIM BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN. The German utilization downanding the handing over of the Substant math on October 1 has been modified as has little's lamous memreduce of Gasesberg.

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Appeasement 1936-1939 Nothing is as simple as it looks...



Few controversies surrounding the causes of WW2

Established consensus: the march to war was inevitable

The trauma of WW1 The Treaty of Versailles The failure of **collective security** The Great Depression The **cowardice** of France & Great Britain



The **aggressors**: Japan, Italy & Germany



The **cowards**: France & Great Britain



The **innocent victims**: Czechoslovakia, Poland and Austria

Nothing is as simple as it looks...







Debate over the **role of the Soviet Union** in 1939 (Nonaggression Pact)


2 schools of thoughts


1. Soviet Union accused of **colluding with Nazi Germany**

Why?

To avoid a conflict with Germany To help the spread of communism To regain territories lost in 1918









2. Stalin acted **to gain time**

Stalin initially favored an alliance with France & Great Britain

Fear of communism in the West

Poland's hostility towards the Soviet Union

Appeasement (negotiation & compromise): was is so wrong?


A **rational policy** for a declining Great Britain?

Everything had to be attempted to avoid another conflict

Churchill: the man of the hour who saved Britain



March 1938: the Anschluss





The "Munich Syndrome"

The **ongoing consensus**: democracies did nothing to stop Berlin, Rome & Tokyo's aggressive foreign policies

Left wing **historiography**: British and French elites fearful of communism and fascinated by the Nazis





Right-wing historiography: **left-wing pacifism** & political divisions led to war The "lessons" of the 1930s: the democracies "capitulated" at Munich (1938)

The need to negotiate in a position of strength

The concept of **preventive** war


The 2003 invasion of Iraq

What the archives tell us...

British & French elites eager to compromise

But

Did the democracies act cowardly towards Hitler?




Fact: a great many number of German generals feared the consequences of a war in 1938

The German army (*Wehrmacht*) not ready

Defensive strategy





German air force (*Luftwaffe*) capabilities & industrial potential overestimated

Anti-appeasers were few in number and poorly organized



Winston Churchill only called for war to stop Germany in 1938



Rearmament (France & Great Britain)

A real effort at rearming


British military budget tripled between 1937 & 1939

1940 British production of aircraft far superior to Germany's

France & Great Britain produced 3 times more tanks than Germany



Nazi Germany on the March, 1936-1939



With hindsight, France & Great Britain should have waged war on Germany in 1938

BUT

War is more than statistics on paper Widespread belief in 1938 that Hitler could be talked into compromising

Hitler's ability to dissimulate his real intentions

German elites & people did not want war



Hitler more aggressive after Munich

Munich Agreement not considered a victory by Hitler


Hitler wanted war (fear Germany could not win an arms race)



Nazi Germany on the March, 1936-1939



Hitler's decision to invade what was left of Czechoslovakia (March 1939): a **wake-up call** for France & Great Britain



Could France & Great Britain have justified a war with sole objective to prevent German populations of Czechoslovakia to be reunited with Germany?

How to think war in 1938?

No one could have anticipated the horrors of WW2

Racial war did not start until the invasion of Poland (September 1939)



Nazi concentration camps paled in comparison to Soviet camps

Millions had died of hunger in the Soviet Union (Ukraine)

1 million executed in Soviet Union prior to 1938



Kristallnacht (9-10 November 1938)

Violence against the Jews: Kristallnacht took place after Munich

Violence against the Jews in France (Alsace-Lorraine & Paris): "greedy" Jews accused of promoting a "Jewish war"









British leaders in 1939: certainty that ALL had been attempted to avoid another war

"A war postponed is often a war avoided"



Democracies and their **colonial empires** Germany, Italy & Japan: why not us?




French & British colonial empires: both a strength & a weakness





SEA OF

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The British nightmare: a war against Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean Sea & Japan in Asia



The **Pact of Steel** (22 May 1939)

A Germano-Italian bilateral alliance





Italian fleet: a threat to vital British communication lines in the Mediterranean

Mediterranean key to British defense system in the Far-East

> 40% of British oil imports via Mediterranean

Active Italian anti-British & anti-French propaganda in the Middle-East & Tunisia The Arab revolt in Palestine: tens of thousands of British troops needed

Rebellion dealt with in 6 months **after** Munich

Fear of Nazi & Fascist propaganda in the Middle-East





Could Hitler have been compelled not to go to war?

Hitler more aggressive after Munich Hitler directly responsible for war in 1939, not the perceived weakness of the democracies



Mobilizing an entire country: a difficult decision

French & British courageous to declare war in September 1939



Conclusion: simple judgements are insufficient

It was all about **context**




1 September 1939: Germany invaded Poland

2 September: Franco-British ultimatum to Germany

3 September: France & Great Britain declared war on Germany





A lack of vision & leadership?

Was Chamberlain naïve & weak?

Authoritarian, pretentious & narcissistic Contradictory judgements on Hitler A poor negotiator

A complex situation

Was an alliance including the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia & Italy possible?

Soviet Union military underestimated (the 1937 Moscow purges)

Fear of communism



The French Army believed to be the best army in the world

> A French defeat unthinkable



Overall balance of military power

France: 90 divisions Belgium: 22 divisions The Netherlands: 10 divisions Great Britain: 10 divisions Total: **132 divisions**

Germany: 135 divisions

3 000 French tanks (of better quality) vs. 2 500 German tanks

Impressive rearming (1936-1939)




1936-1939: a vulnerable German economy

Lack of foreign currencies Lack of natural resources Insufficient coordination

Programs of rearmament reduced by half





Nazi Germany on the March, 1936-1939

Germany isolated

No support to be expected from Italy and Japan


November 1939: the U.S. **Cash** and Carry clause Lack of foreign currencies: Germany unable to benefit The invasion & partition of Poland: a welcome respite

Soviet exports of natural resources (oil) to Germany

BUT

The effects of France & Great Britain's naval blockade

Time not on Germany's side



Hitler to his generals: a military campaign against France & Great Britain

A swift campaign? Maybe not!

445 000 tons of steel allocated to the army (second quarter of 1940): only25 000 to tanks vs. 26 000 to barbed wires and obstacles



A question of military strategies France: a "methodical battle": to engage armies progressively

A centralized direction of operations: no space for initiative or imagination – Total lack of flexibility

A defensive outlook




No war of conquest

The memories of the Great War and its staggering casualties

The demographic factor: Germany: 13.1 million men France: 6.7 million men

The construction of the **Maginot line**: a **logical move** To minimize the human cost & contain the enemy





The many weaknesses of the French military strategy

The tanks reduced to a role of support (infantry)

No concentration of tanks in mechanized units CHARLES DE GAULLE

VERS L'ARMÉE DE MÉTIER

An outnumbered aviation

Priority to missions of observations



The German *Blitzkrieg*: strategy or improvisation?


Germany: limited economic potential

An offensive strategy

Blitzkrieg: a strategy not duly theorized




THE INVASION OF FRANCE 1940: The Plans








Blitzkrieg "is rather an operational act of despair to exit a desperate strategic situation"










France's collapse

Marshal **Philippe Pétain** to lead the French government

Calls for an **armistice**












The Germans were **lucky** The invasion of France: a **risky bet** Flexibility and initiatives French errors





Occupied zone to include the entire Atlantic coast

Italian occupation zone (control of the Mediterranean)

A "Free Zone" A new capital: Vichy

